This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

The Dynamics of Law Clerk Matching: An Experimental and Computational Investigation of Proposals for Reform of the Market

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Ernan Haruvy (University of Texas at Dallas)
Alvin E. Roth (Harvard University)
M. Utku Unver (Koc University)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In September of 1998, the Judicial Conference of the United States abandoned as unsuccessful the attempt—the sixth since 1978—to regulate the dates at which law students are hired as clerks by Federal appellate judges. The market promptly resumed the unraveling of appointment dates that had been temporarily slowed by these efforts. In the academic year 1999-2000 many judges hired clerks in the fall of the second year of law school, almost two years before employment would begin, and before hardly any information about candidates other than first year grades was available. Hiring dates moved still earlier in the Fall of 2000 and 2001. The present paper explores proposed reforms of the market, experimentally in the laboratory, and computationally using genetic algorithms. Our results suggest that some of the special features of the judge/law-clerk market—in particular the feeling among many students and judges that students must accept offers when they are made--present obstacles to the success of the proposed reforms, including the latest reform proposed by the judges, in March 2002, which is a one year moratorium on clerkship hiring. Unlike many markets in which the inability to make binding contracts contributes to market failure, in the law clerk market it is the ease with which binding contracts are forged that harms efficiency.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/exp/papers/0404/0404001.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Experimental with number 0404001.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 02 Apr 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0404001

Note: Type of Document - pdf
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://129.3.20.41

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (EconWPA).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C8 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Li, Hao & Rosen, Sherwin, 1998. "Unraveling in Matching Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 371-87, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Holland, John H & Miller, John H, 1991. "Artificial Adaptive Agents in Economic Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 365-71, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Roth, Alvin E & Xing, Xiaolin, 1997. "Turnaround Time and Bottlenecks in Market Clearing: Decentralized Matching in the Market for Clinical Psychologists," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 284-329, April.
  4. Nick Feltovich, 2000. "Reinforcement-Based vs. Belief-Based Learning Models in Experimental Asymmetric-Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 605-642, May.
  5. Alvin E. Roth & Elliott Peranson, 1999. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," NBER Working Papers 6963, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Yan Chen & Tayfun Sonmez, 2002. "Improving Efficiency of On-Campus Housing: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1669-1686, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Roth, Alvin E & Xing, Xiaolin, 1994. "Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 992-1044, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. C. Nicholas McKinney & Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth, 2005. "The Collapse of a Medical Labor Clearinghouse (and Why Such Failures Are Rare)," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 878-889, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Wing Suen, 2000. "A Competitive Theory of Equilibrium and Disequilibrium Unravelling in Two-Sided Matching," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(1), pages 101-120, Spring.
  10. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 991-1016, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Duffy, John, 2001. "Learning to speculate: Experiments with artificial and real agents," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(3-4), pages 295-319, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Hao Li & Wing Suen, 2000. "Risk Sharing, Sorting, and Early Contracting," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(5), pages 1058-1087, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Erev, Ido & Roth, Alvin E, 1998. "Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 848-81, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Roth, Alvin E, 1991. "A Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry-Level Labor Markets: Regional Markets for New Physicians and Surgeons in the United Kingdom," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 415-40, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Arifovic, Jasmina, 1996. "The Behavior of the Exchange Rate in the Genetic Algorithm and Experimental Economies," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(3), pages 510-41, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Alvin E. Roth, 2002. "The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1341-1378, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992. "Two-sided matching," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Christopher Avery & Christine Jolls & Richard Posner & Alvin E. Roth, 2007. "The New Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks," NBER Working Papers 13213, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  19. John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth, 2000. "The Dynamics Of Reorganization In Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated By A Natural Experiment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(1), pages 201-235, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "Can Pre-arranged Matches Be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 148-156, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth, 2004. "Market Culture: How Norms Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000018, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  22. Muriel Niederle & Alvin E Roth, 2003. "Unraveling reduces the scope of an entry level labor market: Gastroenterology with and without a centralized match," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000428, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Dan Ariely & Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E. Roth, 2002. "An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions," Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-47, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. C. Nicholas McKinney & Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth, 2003. "The collapse of a medical clearinghouse (and why such failures are rare)," NBER Working Papers 9467, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. John Duffy, 2004. "Agent-Based Models and Human Subject Experiments," Computational Economics 0412001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. M. Utku Unver, 2001. "Internet Auctions with Artificial Adaptive Agents," Computing in Economics and Finance 2001 38, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. C. Nicholas McKinney & Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth, 2005. "The Collapse of a Medical Labor Clearinghouse (and Why Such Failures Are Rare)," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 878-889, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Joana Pais & Agnes Pinter & Robert F. Veszteg, 2008. "College admissions and the role of information : an experimental study," Economics Working Papers we080302, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
  7. Muriel Niederle & Alvin E Roth, 2003. "Unraveling reduces the scope of an entry level labor market: Gastroenterology with and without a centralized match," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000428, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Onur B. Celik & Vicki Knoblauch, 2007. "Marriage Matching with Correlated Preferences," Working papers 2007-16, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? It is the publishers that input data about their publications, as there is no staff at RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-2.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.