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Backward Unraveling over Time: The Evolution of Strategic Behavior in the Entry-Level British Medical Labor Markets

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Author Info
M. Utku Unver

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Abstract

This paper studies an adaptive artificial agent model using a genetic algorithm to analyze how a population of decision-makers learns to coordinate on the selection of an equilibrium or a social convention in a two-sided matching game. In the contexts of centralized and decentralized entry-level labor markets, evolution and adjustment paths of unraveling are explored using this model in an environment inspired by the Kagel and Roth (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2000) experimental study. As an interesting result, it is demonstrated that stability need not be required for the success of a matching mechanism under incomplete information in the long run.

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File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/9907/9907001.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9907001.

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Date of creation: 04 Jul 1999
Date of revision: 16 Jul 1999
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9907001

Note: This study won one of the two Graduate Student Prizes awarded by the Society for Computational Economics in 1999. This is a revised draft dated June, 2000.
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: Genetic algorithms; linear programming matching; stability; two-sided matching; unraveling;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C15 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: General - - - Statistical Simulation Methods
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information

Cited by:
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  1. Alvin E Roth & Muriel Niederle, 2007. "Making Markets Thick: Designing Rules for Offers and Acceptances," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000142, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. John Duffy, 2004. "Agent-Based Models and Human Subject Experiments," Computational Economics 0412001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2010-1-31.

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