Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Matching Markets under (In)complete Information

Contents:

Author Info

  • EHLERS, Lars
  • MASSÓ, Jordi

Abstract

We are the first to introduce incomplete information to centralized many-to-one matching markets such as those to entry-level labor markets or college admissions. This is important because in real life markets (i) any agent is uncertain about the other agents' true preferences and (ii) most entry-level matching is many-to-one (and not one-to-one). We show that for stable (matching) mechanisms there is a strong and surprising link between Nash equilibria under complete information and Bayesian Nash equilibria under incomplete information. That is,given a common belief, a strategy profile is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium under incomplete information in a stable mechanism if and only if, for any true profile in the support of the common belief, the submitted profile is a Nash equilibrium under complete information at the true profile in the direct preference revelation game induced by the stable mechanism. This result may help to explain the success of stable mechanisms in these markets.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.cireqmontreal.com/wp-content/uploads/cahiers/01-2007-cah.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 01-2007.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mtl:montec:01-2007

Contact details of provider:
Postal: C.P. 6128, Succ. centre-ville, Montréal (PQ) H3C 3J7
Phone: (514) 343-6557
Fax: (514) 343-7221
Email:
Web page: http://www.cireq.umontreal.ca
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Many-to-One Matching Market; Incomplete Information; Stability;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sönmez, 2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 729-747, June.
  2. Dipjyoti Majumdar, 2003. "Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Stable Matchings," Working Papers 05001, Concordia University, Department of Economics.
  3. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 991-1016, December.
  4. Chen, Yan & Sonmez, Tayfun, 2006. "School choice: an experimental study," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 127(1), pages 202-231, March.
  5. Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth, 2003. "Unraveling Reduces Mobility in a Labor Market: Gastroenterology with and without a Centralized Match," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(6), pages 1342-1352, December.
  6. Antonio Romero-Medina, 1998. "Implementation of stable solutions in a restricted matching market," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 137-147.
  7. Roth, Alvin E., 1985. "The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 277-288, August.
  8. Roth, Alvin E., 1984. "Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 383-387, December.
  9. Shin, Sungwhee & Suh, Sang-Chul, 1996. "A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 185-189, May.
  10. José Alcalde, 1995. "Implementation of Stable Solutions to Marriage Problems," Working Papers. Serie AD 1995-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  11. Dipjyoti Majumdar & Arunava Sen, 2004. "Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(2), pages 523-540, 03.
  12. Crawford, Vincent P., 1991. "Comparative statics in matching markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 389-400, August.
  13. Sonmez, Tayfun, 1997. "Games of Manipulation in Marriage Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 169-176, August.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Guillaume Haeringer & Caterina Calsamiglia & Flip Klijn, 2009. "Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 2009.29, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  2. Eric Budish & Estelle Cantillon, 2012. "The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/99376, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mtl:montec:01-2007. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sharon BREWER).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.