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Constrained School Choice

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Author Info
Guillaume Haeringer ()
Flip Klijn ()

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Abstract

Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston mechanism the transition would lead to efficiency gains. The first two mechanisms are strategy-proof, but in practice student assignment procedures typically impede a student to submit a preference list that contains all his acceptable schools. We study the preference revelation game where students can only declare up to a fixed number of schools to be acceptable. We focus on the stability and efficiency of the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Our main results identify rather stringent necessary and sufficient conditions on the priorities to guarantee stability or efficiency of either of the two mechanisms. This stands in sharp contrast with the Boston mechanism which has been abandoned in many US school districts but nevertheless yields stable Nash equilibrium outcomes.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 671.06.

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Length: 32
Date of creation: 06 Nov 2006
Date of revision: 02 Dec 2008
Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:671.06

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Related research
Keywords: school choice; matching; stability; Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm; top trading cycles; Boston mechanism; acyclic priority structure; truncation;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    Other versions:
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A Pathak & Alvin E Roth, 2008. "Strategy-proofness vs. Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redisigning the NYC High School Match," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000002108, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Fuhito Kojima, 2008. "Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 357-365, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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