Games implementing the stable rule of marriage problems in strong Nash equilibria
AbstractIn a marriage problem, we introduce a condition called "exclusive matchability (EM)": the condition mainly says that each pair of a man and a woman can choose to be a matching pair regardless of others' actions. This condition is essential to strong Nash implementation of the stable rule. We show that any mechanism which satisfies exclusive matchability implements the stable rule in strong Nash equilibria.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 20 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Note: Received: 17 May 1999/Accepted: 30 August 2001
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- Guillaume Haeringer & Flip Klijn, 2008.
"Constrained School Choice,"
294, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
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