Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Központi felvételi rendszerek: Taktikázás és stabilitás

Contents:

Author Info

  • László Á. Kóczy

    ()
    (Budapest Tech)

Abstract

Egy központi felvételi rendszer feladata a jelentkezők és az iskolák, vagy szakok párosítása. Ez a párosítás többféleképpen is történhet, azonban a gyakran igen különböző felvételi rendszerek is leírhatók néhány alapelv mentén. Ilyen alapelvként fogalmazható meg, hogy egy párosítás legyen stabil, Pareto optimális, vagy hogy mentes legyen a taktikázástól. Ismertetünk pár ismert jó és kevésbé jó párosító algoritmust, áttekintjük alapvető tulajdonságaikat, illetve kitérünk olyan jellemzőkre, melyek meghatározhatják egy felvételi rendszer elfogadottságát. A magyarországi felvételi rendszereket egy külön dolgozatban vizsgáljuk.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://uni-obuda.hu/users/vecseya/RePEc/pkk/wpaper/0901.pdf
File Function: Author's Accepted Manuscript, 2009
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management in its series Working Paper Series with number 0901.

as in new window
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pkk:wpaper:0901

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 1084 Budapest, Tavaszmezö u. 15-17
Phone: +36-1-6665208
Fax: +36-1-6665209
Web page: http://www.kgk.uni-obuda.hu
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: stabil párosítások; Gale-Shapley algoritmus; stratégiai viselkedés; bostoni mechanizmus;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth, 2000. "The Dynamics Of Reorganization In Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated By A Natural Experiment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(1), pages 201-235, February.
  2. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sönmez, 2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 729-747, June.
  3. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sonmez, 1998. "Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 689-702, May.
  4. Alvin E. Roth & Elliott Peranson, 1999. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," NBER Working Papers 6963, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Alcalde, J. & Barberà, S., 1992. "Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 196.92, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  6. Chung-Piaw Teo & Jay Sethuraman & Wee-Peng Tan, 2001. "Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage Problem Revisited: Strategic Issues and Applications," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 47(9), pages 1252-1267, September.
  7. Kelso, Alexander S, Jr & Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1483-1504, November.
  8. Pathak, Parag A. & Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Roth, Alvin, 2005. "The New York City High School Match," Scholarly Articles 2562765, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  9. Balinski, Michel & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 73-94, January.
  10. Alvin E Roth, 2007. "Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000283, UCLA Department of Economics.
  11. Roth, Alvin E., 1985. "The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 277-288, August.
  12. Chen, Yan & Sonmez, Tayfun, 2006. "School choice: an experimental study," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 127(1), pages 202-231, March.
  13. Sönmez, Tayfun & Pathak, Parag A. & Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Roth, Alvin, 2005. "The Boston Public School Match," Scholarly Articles 2562764, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  14. Haluk Ergin & Tayfun Sönmez, 2005. "Games of School Choice under the Boston Mechanism," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 619, Boston College Department of Economics.
  15. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 991-1016, December.
  16. Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "House Allocation with Existing Tenants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 233-260, October.
  17. Roth, Alvin E, 1986. "On the Allocation of Residents to Rural Hospitals: A General Property of Two-Sided Matching Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 425-27, March.
  18. Roth, Alvin E, 1991. "A Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry-Level Labor Markets: Regional Markets for New Physicians and Surgeons in the United Kingdom," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 415-40, June.
  19. Antonio Romero-Medina, 1998. "Implementation of stable solutions in a restricted matching market," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 137-147.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Biró, Péter, 2011. "A társadalmi döntések számítástudománya - egy új határterület. European Future Technologies Conference and Exhibition (FET'11) COMSOC (Computational Social Choice) szekció MTA Közgazdaság," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 709-715.
  2. Kóczy Á., László, 2010. "A magyarországi felvételi rendszerek sajátosságai
    [Specific features of Hungarys system of school and university admissions]
    ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 142-164.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pkk:wpaper:0901. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alexandra Vécsey).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.