Implementation of stable solutions in a restricted matching market
AbstractI analyze the admission mechanism used in Spanish universities. The system is open to strategic manipulation. This is because students are not allowed to express the whole list of available options. However, the mechanism implements the set of stable matchings in Nash equilibrium and the student's optimum in strong equilibrium. The mechanism also implements the students' optimum, in Nash equilibrium, under the class of "non-reverse" preferences. All these properties come from the fact that colleges do not have the opportunity to misrepresent their preferences.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economic Design.
Volume (Year): 3 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Note: Received: 30 June 1995 / Accepted: 31 January 1997
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
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