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In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm

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  • Ehlers, Lars

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 48 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Pages: 249-270

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:48:y:2004:i:2:p:249-270

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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References

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  1. José Alcalde, 1995. "Implementation of Stable Solutions to Marriage Problems," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 1995-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  2. Alcalde, Jose & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2000. "Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admissions Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 294-302, May.
  3. Antonio Romero-Medina, 1998. "Implementation of stable solutions in a restricted matching market," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 137-147.
  4. Alvin E. Roth & Elliott Peranson, 1999. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," NBER Working Papers 6963, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Alcalde, J. & Barberà, S., 1992. "Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 196.92, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  6. Roth, Alvin E & Vande Vate, John H, 1991. "Incentives in Two-Sided Matching with Random Stable Mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 31-44, January.
  7. Roth, Alvin E., 1989. "Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 191-209, June.
  8. Alvin E. Roth & Uriel G. Rothblum, 1999. "Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets--In Search of Advice for Participants," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 67(1), pages 21-44, January.
  9. Roth, Alvin E., 1984. "Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 383-387, December.
  10. Ma Jinpeng, 1995. "Stable Matchings and Rematching-Proof Equilibria in a Two-Sided Matching Market," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 352-369, August.
  11. Sonmez, Tayfun, 1997. "Games of Manipulation in Marriage Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 169-176, August.
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Cited by:
  1. Joana Pais & Agnes Pinter, 2007. "School Choice and Information. An Experimental Study on Matching Mechanisms," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena, University of Siena 018, University of Siena.
  2. Lars Ehlers & Jordi Massó, 2004. "Incomplete Information and Small Cores in Matching Markets," Working Papers 147, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  3. César Alonso-Borrego & Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2007. "Converging to Efficiency: the Ramón y Cajal Program Experience," Carlo Alberto Notebooks, Collegio Carlo Alberto 49, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  4. Fuhito Kojima & Parag A. Pathak, 2009. "Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 608-27, June.
  5. Joana Pais & Agnes Pinter & Robert F. Veszteg, 2008. "College admissions and the role of information : an experimental study," Economics Working Papers we080302, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  6. Dipjyoti Majumdar, 2003. "Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Stable Matchings," Working Papers, Concordia University, Department of Economics 05001, Concordia University, Department of Economics.

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