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A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure

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  • Perez-Castrillo, D.
  • Sotomayor, M.

Abstract

For the assignment game, we anlayze the following mechanism: sellers, simultaneously, fix their prices first, then buyers, sequentially, decide which object to buy, if any, among the remaining objects. The first phase of the game determines the potential proces, while the second phase determines the actual matching. We prove that the set of subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies in the strong sense of the mechanism coincides with the set of sellers' optimal stable outcomes when buyers use maximal strategies.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 421.98.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:421.98

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Keywords: MODELS ; GAMES;

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References

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  1. Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1986. "Multi-Item Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 863-72, August.
  2. Serrano Roberto, 1995. "A Market to Implement the Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 285-294, October.
  3. José Alcalde Pérez & Antonio Romero-Medina, 1996. "Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 1996-13, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  4. Alcalde, Jose, 1996. "Implementation of Stable Solutions to Marriage Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 240-254, April.
  5. Roth, Alvin E., 1984. "Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 383-387, December.
  6. José Alcalde Pérez & Antonio Romero-Medina & David Pérez-Castrillo, 1997. "Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 1997-10, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  7. Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David, 1985. "The Strategy Structure of Two-sided Matching Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 873-88, July.
  8. Peraz-Castrillo, J., 1992. "Cooperative Outcomes Through Non-Cooperative Games," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 165.92, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  9. Kamecke, U, 1989. "Non-cooperative Matching Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 423-31.
  10. Kelso, Alexander S, Jr & Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1483-1504, November.
  11. Crawford, Vincent P & Knoer, Elsie Marie, 1981. "Job Matching with Heterogeneous Firms and Workers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 49(2), pages 437-50, March.
  12. Perry, Motty & Reny, Philip J, 1994. "A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 795-817, July.
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Cited by:
  1. Camina, Ester, 2006. "A generalized assignment game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 152-161, September.
  2. Arribas, Ivan & Urbano, Amparo, 2005. "Nash equilibria in a model of multiproduct price competition: an assignment problem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 351-385, April.
  3. Eduard Alonso-Paulí & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2012. "Codes of Best Practice in competitive markets for managers," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 49(1), pages 113-141, January.
  4. Francis Bloch & Effrosyni Diamantoudi, 2011. "Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 263-280, May.
  5. Kaniska Dam, 2003. "The Principal-Agent Matching Market," CESifo Working Paper Series 945, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Ahmet Alkan & Alparslan Tuncay, 2014. "Pairing Games and Markets," Working Papers 2014.48, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  7. Takashi Hayashi & Toyotaka Sakai, 2009. "Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 38(4), pages 453-467, November.
  8. Bolle, Friedel & Breitmoser, Yves & Otto, Philipp E., 2011. "A positive theory of cooperative games: The logit core and its variants," MPRA Paper 32918, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Sotomayor, Marilda, 2004. "Implementation in the many-to-many matching market," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 199-212, January.
  10. Marilda Sotomayor, 2009. "Adjusting prices in the multiple-partners assignment game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 38(4), pages 575-600, November.
  11. F. Javier Martinez de Albeniz & Carles Rafels, 2012. "Monge assignment games," Working Papers in Economics 282, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.

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