José Alcalde () (Universidad de Andalucía) Antonio Romero Medina (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid) David Pérez-Castrillo (Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona)
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We implement the core correspondence in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium using a simplesequential mechanism in which firms propose a salary to each worker (in the first stage). Then ,each worker accepts at most one proposal (second stage). Moreover, we show that, if agents'preferences are additive, this mechanism implements in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium that firms'optimal correspondence when firms employ undominated strategies. Finally we construct anothersimple sequential mechanism to implement workers' optimal correspondence when agents'preferences are additive.
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Paper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie AD with number
1997-10.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992.
"Two-sided matching,"
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,
in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541
Elsevier.
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Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
David Pérez-Castrillo & Marilda Sotomayor, 2003.
"A Selling Mechanism,"
Revista Brasileira de Economia,
Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil), vol. 57(4), April.
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