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A generalized assignment game

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  • Camina, Ester

Abstract

The proposed game is a natural extension of the Shapley and Shubik Assignment Game to the case where each seller owns a set of different objets instead of only one indivisible object. We propose definitions of pairwise stability and group stability that are adapted to our framework. Existence of both pairwise and group stable outcomes is proved. We study the structure of the group stable set and we finally prove that the set of group stable payoffs forms a complete lattice with one optimal group stable payoff for each side of the market.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

Volume (Year): 52 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (September)
Pages: 152-161

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Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:52:y:2006:i:2:p:152-161

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565

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References

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  1. Sotomayor, Marilda, 1999. "Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 55-70, July.
  2. Jorge Oviedo & Federico Echenique, 2005. "A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets," 2005 Meeting Papers 233, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  3. Roth, Alvin E., 1985. "The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 277-288, August.
  4. Perez-Castrillo, D. & Sotomayor, M., 1998. "A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 421.98, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  5. José Alcalde Pérez & Antonio Romero-Medina & David Pérez-Castrillo, 1997. "Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 1997-10, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  6. Marilda Sotomayor, 1999. "The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 567-583.
  7. Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1986. "Multi-Item Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 863-72, August.
  8. Kamecke, U, 1989. "Non-cooperative Matching Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 423-31.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Marilda Sotomayor, 2013. "Labor Time Shared In The Assignment Game Generating New Cooperative And Competitive Structures," Working Papers, Department of Economics 2013_02, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP).
  2. Daniel Jaume & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2012. "The multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria," Computational Statistics, Springer, Springer, vol. 76(2), pages 161-187, October.
  3. repec:spa:wpaper:2013wpecon02 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Funaki, Y. & Houba, H.E.D. & Motchenkova, E., 2012. "Market Power in Bilateral Oligopoly Markets with Nonexpendable Infrastructure," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center 2012-041, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
  5. Yukihiko Funaki & Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova, 2012. "Market Power in Bilateral Oligopoly Markets with Nonexpandable Infrastructures," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-139/II, Tinbergen Institute.

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