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A generalized assignment game

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  • Camina, Ester

Abstract

The proposed game is a natural extension of the Shapley and Shubik Assignment Game to the case where each seller owns a set of different objets instead of only one indivisible object. We propose definitions of pairwise stability and group stability that are adapted to our framework. Existence of both pairwise and group stable outcomes is proved. We study the structure of the group stable set and we finally prove that the set of group stable payoffs forms a complete lattice with one optimal group stable payoff for each side of the market.
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Suggested Citation

  • Camina, Ester, 2006. "A generalized assignment game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 152-161, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:52:y:2006:i:2:p:152-161
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. , & ,, 2006. "A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(2), pages 233-273, June.
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    7. Marilda Sotomayor, 1992. "The Multiple Partners Game," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Mukul Majumdar (ed.), Equilibrium and Dynamics, chapter 17, pages 322-354, Palgrave Macmillan.
    8. Marilda Sotomayor, 1999. "The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(4), pages 567-583.
    9. Roth, Alvin E., 1985. "The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 277-288, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yukihiko Funaki & Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova, 2020. "Market power in bilateral oligopoly markets with non-expandable infrastructures," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(2), pages 525-546, June.
    2. Daniel Jaume & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2012. "The multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 76(2), pages 161-187, October.
    3. Jeremy T. Fox, 2010. "Identification in matching games," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(2), pages 203-254, November.
    4. Eric Bahel & Christian Trudeau, 2018. "Stable cost sharing in production allocation games," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 22(1), pages 25-53, June.
    5. repec:spa:wpaper:2013wpecon02 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Jeremy T. Fox, 2018. "Estimating matching games with transfers," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), pages 1-38, March.
    7. Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2014. "On cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: Limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 187-215.
    8. Nikhil Agarwal, 2015. "An Empirical Model of the Medical Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(7), pages 1939-1978, July.
    9. Marilda Sotomayor, 2013. "Labor Time Shared In The Assignment Game Generating New Cooperative And Competitive Structures," Working Papers, Department of Economics 2013_02, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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