I study a many-to-many, two-sided, transferable-utility matching game. Consider data on matches or relationships between agents but not on the choice set of each agent. I investigate what economic parameters can be learned from data on equilibrium matches and agent characteristics. Features of a production function, which gives the surplus from a match, are nonparametrically identified. In particular, the ratios of complementarities from multiple pairs of inputs are identified. Also, the ordering of production levels is identified.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number
15092.
Length: Date of creation: Jun 2009 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15092
Note: IO LS TWP Contact details of provider: Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A. Phone: 617-868-3900 Email: Web page: http://www.nber.org More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().
Related research
Keywords:
Find related papers by JEL classification: C14 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: General - - - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods C3 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables C35 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
John William Hatfield & Paul R. Milgrom, 2005.
"Matching with Contracts,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 913-935, September.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Goeree, Jacob & Holt, Charles & Palfrey, Thomas, 2005.
"Regular Quantal Response Equilibrium,"
Working Papers
1219, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2004.
"Regular quantal response equilibrium,"
Working Papers
1203, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!]
Gary S. Becker, 1974.
"A Theory of Marriage: Part II,"
NBER Chapters,
in: Marriage, Family, Human Capital, and Fertility, pages 11-26
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!]
Dagsvik, John K, 2000.
"Aggregation in Matching Markets,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(1), pages 27-57, February.
Other versions:
Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1986.
"Multi-Item Auctions,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 863-72, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)