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Identification in Matching Games

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  • Jeremy T. Fox

Abstract

I study a many-to-many, two-sided, transferable-utility matching game. Consider data on matches or relationships between agents but not on the choice set of each agent. I investigate what economic parameters can be learned from data on equilibrium matches and agent characteristics. Features of a production function, which gives the surplus from a match, are nonparametrically identified. In particular, the ratios of complementarities from multiple pairs of inputs are identified. Also, the ordering of production levels is identified.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 15092.

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Date of creation: Jun 2009
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Publication status: published as Jeremy T. Fox, 2010. "Identification in matching games," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(2), pages 203-254, November.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15092

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Cited by:
  1. Peter Arcidiacono & Andrew Beauchamp & Marjorie McElroy, 2012. "Terms of Endearment: An Equilibrium Model of Sex and Matching," Working Papers, Duke University, Department of Economics 12-21, Duke University, Department of Economics.
  2. Uetake, Kosuke & Watanabe, Yasutora, 2012. "A note on estimation of two-sided matching models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 535-537.
  3. NAKAJIMA Kentaro, 2012. "Transactions as a Source of Agglomeration Economies: Buyer-seller matching in the Japanese manufacturing industry," Discussion papers, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) 12021, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).

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