A Many-to-Many 'Rural Hospital Theorem'
AbstractWe show that the full version of the so-called 'rural hospital theorem' (Roth, 1986) generalizes to many-to-many matching where agents on both sides of the market have separable and substitutable preferences.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 877.11.
Date of creation: 27 Jun 2011
Date of revision:
matching; many-to-many; stability; rural hospital theorem.;
Other versions of this item:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
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DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO
009997, UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO.
- Paula Jaramillo & Çagatay Kayi & Flip Klijn, 2012. "On the Exhaustiveness of Truncation and Dropping Strategies in Many-to-Many Matching Markets," Working Papers 632, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Paula Jaramillo & Cagatay Kay & Flip Klijn, 2012. "On the Exhaustiveness of Truncation and Dropping Strategies in Many-to-Many Matching Markets," DOCUMENTOS CEDE 010316, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
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