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The Package Assignment Model

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Author Info
Bikhchandani, Sushil
Ostroy, Joseph M.

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Abstract

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-47K0WB5-9/2/630cb66b1344defc9fd89b6dc074ff55
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 107 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
Pages: 377-406
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:107:y:2002:i:2:p:377-406

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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  1. Michael J. Ryan, 2005. "Applications of a more for less result to labour markets and to auctions," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 12(8), pages 485-488, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Lahiri, Somdeb, 2008. "Envy-free solutions, Non-linear equilibrium and Egalitarian-equivalence for the Package Assignment Problem," MPRA Paper 8444, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 28 Apr 2008. [Downloadable!]
  3. Peter R. Wurman & Michael P. Wellman, 1999. "Equilibrium Prices in Bundle Auctions," Working Papers 99-09-064, Santa Fe Institute.
  4. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Paul Milgrom, 2005. "Ascending Proxy Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000785, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Ilya Segal, 2004. "The Communication Requirements of of Social Choice Rules and Supporting Budget Sets," Economics Working Papers 0039, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
  6. Gabrielle Demange, 2006. "The strategy structure of some coalition formation games," PSE Working Papers 2006-38, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Somdeb Lahiri, 2006. "Existence of Equilibrium for Integer Allocation Problems," Computing in Economics and Finance 2006 8, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. MISHRA, Debasis & PARKES, David C., 2005. "Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations," CORE Discussion Papers 2005052, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
  9. Ivan Arribas & Amparo Urbano, 2004. "Mixed Bundling Strategies And Multiproduct Price Competition," Working Papers. Serie AD 2004-01, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  10. DeMartini, Christine & Kwasnica, Anthony M. & Ledyard, John O. & Porter, David, 1998. "A New and Improved Design For Multi-Object Iterative Auctions," Working Papers 1054, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  11. Ivan Arribas & Amparo Urbano, 2003. "Nash Equilibria In A Model Of Multiproduct Price Competition: An Assignment Problem," Working Papers. Serie AD 2003-21, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Bykowsky, Mark M. & Cull, Robert J. & Ledyard, John O., 1998. "Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem," Working Papers 916, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Lok,Reinder B. & Romero Morales,Dolores & Vermeulen,Dries, 2005. "The Agents-are-Substitutes Property in Continuous Generalized Assignment Problems," Research Memoranda 008, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  14. Sushil Bikhchandani & Shurojit Chatterjee & Arunava Sen, 2004. "Incentive Compatibility in Multi-unit Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000750, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  15. Drexl, Andreas & Jörnsten, Kurt & Knof, Diether, 2005. "Non-linear anonymous pricing in combinatorial auctions," Discussion Papers 2005/6, Department of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
  16. Lawrence M. Ausubel, 2006. "An Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 602-629, June. [Downloadable!]
  17. Mishra, Debasis & Talman, Dolf, 2006. "Overdemand and underdemand in economies with invisible goods and unit demands," Discussion Paper 84, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  18. Paul Milgrom, 2006. "Package Auctions and Package Exchanges: the 2004 Fisher-Schultz Lecture," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000131, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  19. Milind Dawande & R. Chandrashekaran & J. Kalagnanam, 2002. "Using Linear Programming in a Business-to-Business Auction Mechanism," Review of Marketing Science Working Papers 1-4-1002, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]
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