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Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism

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  • Marilda Sotomayor

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s001820300156
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Games Theory.

Volume (Year): 32 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
Pages: 241-251

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:32:y:2003:i:2:p:241-251

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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm

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Related research

Keywords: stable matching; subgame perfect Nash equilibrium; direct mechanism; strong equilibrium;

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Cited by:
  1. Cesar Alonso Borrego & Antonio Romero Medina & Mateo Triossi, 2007. "Converging to efficiency : the Ramón y Cajal Program experience," Economics Working Papers we075328, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  2. Guillaume Haeringer & Flip Klijn, 2006. "Constrained School Choice," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 671.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), revised 02 Dec 2008.
  3. Matteo Triossi, 2006. "Application Costs in Sequential Admission Mechanisms," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 23, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  4. Triossi, Matteo, 2009. "Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 566-575, May.
  5. Ergin, Haluk & Sonmez, Tayfun, 2006. "Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 215-237, January.
  6. Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2011. "Games with Capacity Manipulation: Incentives and Nash Equilibria," Documentos de Trabajo, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile 280, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  7. Marilda Sotomayor, 2012. "A further note on the college admission game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 179-193, February.

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