Non-revelation Mechanisms in Many-to-One Markets
AbstractThis paper presents a sequential admission mechanism where students are allowed to send multiple applications to colleges and colleges sequentially decide the applicants to enroll. The irreversibility of agents decisions and the sequential structure of the enrollments make truthful behavior a dominant strategy for colleges. Due to these features, the mechanism implements the set of stable matchings in Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium. We extend the analysis to a mechanism where colleges make proposals to potential students and students decide sequentially. We show that this mechanism implements the stable set as well.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile in its series Documentos de Trabajo with number 273.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
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- Alejandra Mizala & Pilar Romaguera & Sebastian Gallegos, 2010. "Public-Private Wage Gap In Latin America (1999-2007): A Matching Approach," Documentos de Trabajo 268, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2011.
"Games with capacity manipulation : incentives and Nash equilibria,"
Economics Working Papers
we1125, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
- Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2013. "Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 701-720, September.
- Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2011. "Games with Capacity Manipulation: Incentives and Nash Equilibria," Documentos de Trabajo 280, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2007. "Games of Capacities: A (Close) Look to Nash Equilibria," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 52, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- Antonio Romero Medina & Mateo Triossi, 2007. "Games of capacities : a (close) look to Nash Equilibria," Economics Working Papers we075933, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
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