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Matteo Triossi

Personal Details

First Name:Matteo
Middle Name:
Last Name:Triossi
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:ptr54
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
Terminal Degree:2006 Departamento de Economía; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Dipartimento di Management
Università Ca' Foscari Venezia

Venezia, Italy
http://www.unive.it/management
RePEc:edi:mdvenit (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Matteo Triossi & María Haydée Fonseca-Mairena, 2019. "Incentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities," Documentos de Trabajo 345, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  2. Romero-Medina, Antonio & Triossi, Matteo, 2018. "Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets," UC3M Working papers. Economics 24368, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  3. Romero-Medina, Antonio & Triossi, Matteo, 2018. "Centralized Course Allocation," UC3M Working papers. Economics 27388, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  4. Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2017. "(Group) Strategy-proofness and stability in many-to many marching markets," Documentos de Trabajo 332, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  5. Romero-Medina, Antonio & Triossi, Matteo, 2017. "Group strategy-proof stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation under multi-unit demand: a note," UC3M Working papers. Economics 25310, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  6. Romero-Medina, Antonio & Triossi, Matteo, 2017. "Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets," UC3M Working papers. Economics 26081, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  7. Matteo Triossi, 2014. "Assessing the extent of democratic failures. A 99%-Condorcet’s Jury Theorem," Documentos de Trabajo 306, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  8. Matteo Triossi & Patricio Valdivieso & Benjamín Villena-Roldán, 2013. "A Spatial Model of Voting with Endogenous Proposals: Theory and Evidence from Chilean Senate," Documentos de Trabajo 294, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  9. Alonso-Borrego, César & Romero-Medina, Antonio & Sánchez Mangas, Rocío & Triossi, Matteo, 2012. "Boosting scientific research : evidence from a public program," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1223, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  10. Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2012. "Neutral Mergers Between Bilateral Markets," Documentos de Trabajo 292, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  11. Romero-Medina, Antonio & Triossi, Matteo, 2011. "Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1126, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  12. Matteo Triossiv, 2010. "Costly information acquisition. Better to toss a coin?," Documentos de Trabajo 267, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  13. Romero-Medina, Antonio & Triossi, Matteo, 2010. "Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1018, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  14. Luis Corchón & Matteo Triossi, 2008. "Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent," Documentos de Trabajo 255, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  15. Matteo Triossi, 2008. "Costly information acquisition. Part I: better to toss a coin?," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 68, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  16. Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2007. "Games of Capacities: A (Close) Look to Nash Equilibria," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 52, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  17. Matteo Triossi & Antonio Romero-Medina, 2006. "Ramón y Cajal: Mediation and Meritocracy," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 22, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  18. Matteo Triossi, 2006. "Reliability and Responsibility: A Theory of Endogenous Commitment," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 21, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  19. Matteo Triossi & Luis Corchón, 2006. "Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets and Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 24, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  20. Matteo Triossi, 2006. "Application Costs in Sequential Admission Mechanisms," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 23, Collegio Carlo Alberto.

Articles

  1. Fonseca-Mairena, María Haydée & Triossi, Matteo, 2023. "Coalition formation problems with externalities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
  2. Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2023. "Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(2), pages 591-623, February.
  3. Fonseca-Mairena, María Haydée & Triossi, Matteo, 2022. "Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
  4. Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2021. "Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(1), pages 105-118, March.
  5. Antonio Romero‐Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2020. "Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 16(3), pages 349-354, September.
  6. Fonseca-Mairena, María Haydée & Triossi, Matteo, 2019. "Incentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
  7. Romero-Medina, Antonio & Triossi, Matteo, 2014. "Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 624-630.
  8. Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2013. "Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(3), pages 701-720, September.
  9. Triossi, Matteo, 2013. "Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 169-191.
  10. César Alonso-Borrego & Antonio Romero-Medina & Rocío Sánchez-Mangas & Matteo Triossi, 2013. "Boosting Scientific Research: Evidence From A Public Program," Revista de Economia Aplicada, Universidad de Zaragoza, Departamento de Estructura Economica y Economia Publica, vol. 21(2), pages 115-128, Autumn.
  11. Romero-Medina, Antonio & Triossi, Matteo, 2013. "Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 237-239.
  12. Luis Corchón & Matteo Triossi, 2011. "Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(2), pages 179-198, February.
  13. Triossi, Matteo, 2009. "Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 566-575, May.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Matteo Triossi & María Haydée Fonseca-Mairena, 2019. "Incentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities," Documentos de Trabajo 345, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.

    Cited by:

    1. Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2017. "Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets," Documentos de Trabajo 328, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    2. Gallego, J & Rivero, G & Martínez, J.D., 2018. "Preventing rather than Punishing: An Early Warning Model of Malfeasance in Public Procurement," Documentos de Trabajo 16724, Universidad del Rosario.
    3. Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetivoc, 2021. "When and How to Use Public-Private Partnerships in Infrastructure: Lessons from the International Experience," Documentos de Trabajo 349, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    4. Cesar Martinelli, 2020. "Accountability and Grand Corruption," Working Papers 1077, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
    5. Fonseca-Mairena, María Haydée & Triossi, Matteo, 2022. "Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    6. Fonseca-Mairena, María Haydée & Triossi, Matteo, 2023. "Coalition formation problems with externalities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).

  2. Romero-Medina, Antonio & Triossi, Matteo, 2018. "Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets," UC3M Working papers. Economics 24368, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.

    Cited by:

    1. Ronald Fischer, 2017. "Efectos de la Reforma del Código de Aguas," Documentos de Trabajo 335, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    2. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2017. "Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 17.01, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.

  3. Romero-Medina, Antonio & Triossi, Matteo, 2017. "Group strategy-proof stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation under multi-unit demand: a note," UC3M Working papers. Economics 25310, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.

    Cited by:

    1. Romero-Medina, Antonio & Triossi, Matteo, 2017. "Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets," UC3M Working papers. Economics 26081, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.

  4. Romero-Medina, Antonio & Triossi, Matteo, 2017. "Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets," UC3M Working papers. Economics 26081, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.

    Cited by:

    1. Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2018. "Centralized Course Allocation," Documentos de Trabajo 340, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    2. Gutin, Gregory Z. & Neary, Philip R. & Yeo, Anders, 2023. "Unique stable matchings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 529-547.
    3. Antonio Romero‐Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2020. "Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 16(3), pages 349-354, September.

  5. Romero-Medina, Antonio & Triossi, Matteo, 2011. "Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1126, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.

    Cited by:

    1. Romero-Medina, Antonio & Triossi, Matteo, 2011. "Games with capacity manipulation : incentives and Nash equilibria," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1125, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    2. Takashi Akahoshi, 2014. "A necessary and sufficient condition for stable matching rules to be strategy-proof," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(3), pages 683-702, October.
    3. Estelle Cantillon & Li Chen & Juan S. Pereyra, 2022. "Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off?," Papers 2212.02881, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2024.
    4. Romero-Medina, Antonio & Triossi, Matteo, 2017. "Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets," UC3M Working papers. Economics 26081, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    5. Akahoshi, Takashi, 2014. "Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 7-13.
    6. Karpov, Alexander, 2019. "A necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness consistency in the stable marriage matching problem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 63-65.
    7. Chen, Yajing & Jiao, Zhenhua & Zhang, Yang & Zhao, Fang, 2021. "Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
    8. Gregory Z. Gutin & Philip R. Neary & Anders Yeo, 2021. "Unique Stable Matchings," Papers 2106.12977, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
    9. Jaeok Park, 2015. "Competitive Equilibrium and Singleton Cores in Generalized Matching Problems (published in:International Journal of Game Theory, May 2017, Vol.46, Issue2, 487-509)," Working papers 2015rwp-85, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
    10. Jaeok Park, 2017. "Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(2), pages 487-509, May.
    11. Wu, Qinggong, 2015. "A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 216-242.
    12. Estelle Cantillon & Li Chen & Juan Sebastian Pereyra Barreiro, 2022. "Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off ?," Working Papers ECARES 2022-39, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    13. Tello Benjamín, 2018. "Stability of Equilibrium Outcomes under Deferred Acceptance: Acyclicity and Dropping Strategies," Working Papers 2018-05, Banco de México.
    14. Gutin, Gregory Z. & Neary, Philip R. & Yeo, Anders, 2023. "Unique stable matchings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 529-547.

  6. Romero-Medina, Antonio & Triossi, Matteo, 2010. "Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1018, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.

    Cited by:

    1. BONKOUNGOU, Somouaoga, 2016. "Pareto dominance of deferred acceptance through early decision," Cahiers de recherche 2016-07, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    2. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2017. "Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 17.01, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    3. Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2017. "Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets," Documentos de Trabajo 328, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    4. Bó, Inácio Guerberoff Lanari & Hakimov, Rustamdjan, 2016. "The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2016-212, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    5. Romero-Medina, Antonio & Triossi, Matteo, 2011. "Games with capacity manipulation : incentives and Nash equilibria," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1125, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    6. Alfredo Salgado-Torres, 2012. "A simple decentralized matching mechanism in markets with couples," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(3), pages 2044-2055.
    7. Somouaoga Bonkoungou, 2021. "Decentralized college admissions under single application," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 25(1), pages 65-91, June.
    8. Andersson, Tommy & Dur, Umut & Ertemel, Sinan & Kesten, Onur, 2018. "Sequential School Choice with Public and Private Schools," Working Papers 2018:39, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 31 Oct 2023.
    9. Salgado Alfredo, 2018. "Incomplete Information and Costly Signaling in College Admissions," Working Papers 2018-23, Banco de México.
    10. Alcalde, José, 2018. "Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (Hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 32-49.
    11. Alcalde, José, 2016. "(In)visible Hands in Matching Markets," QM&ET Working Papers 16-2, University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory.
    12. Somouaoga BONKOUNGOU, 2016. "Pareto Dominance of Deferred Acceptance through Early Decision," Cahiers de recherche 11-2016, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    13. B. Evci, 2014. "A new dynamic mechanism to the marriage problem with a variant," Working Papers wp973, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    14. Yasushi Kawase & Keisuke Bando, 2021. "Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(2), pages 503-546, June.

  7. Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2007. "Games of Capacities: A (Close) Look to Nash Equilibria," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 52, Collegio Carlo Alberto.

    Cited by:

    1. Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2011. "Acyclicity and Singleton Cores in Matching Markets," Documentos de Trabajo 281, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    2. EHLERS, Lars, 2009. "Manipulation via Capacities Revisited," Cahiers de recherche 04-2009, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    3. Assaf Romm, 2014. "Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(4), pages 851-875, December.

  8. Matteo Triossi & Antonio Romero-Medina, 2006. "Ramón y Cajal: Mediation and Meritocracy," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 22, Collegio Carlo Alberto.

    Cited by:

    1. Marques, Pedro & Morgan, Kevin, 2020. "Innovation without regional development? The complex interplay of innovation, institutions and development," Papers in Innovation Studies 2020/3, Lund University, CIRCLE - Centre for Innovation Research.

  9. Matteo Triossi & Luis Corchón, 2006. "Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets and Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 24, Collegio Carlo Alberto.

    Cited by:

    1. Corchón, Luis C., 2008. "The theory of implementation : what did we learn?," UC3M Working papers. Economics we081207, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.

Articles

  1. Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2023. "Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(2), pages 591-623, February.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Fonseca-Mairena, María Haydée & Triossi, Matteo, 2022. "Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).

    Cited by:

    1. María Haydée Fonseca‐Mairena & Matteo Triossi, 2023. "Notes on marriage markets with weak externalities," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(4), pages 860-868, October.

  3. Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2021. "Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(1), pages 105-118, March.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Antonio Romero‐Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2020. "Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 16(3), pages 349-354, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Romero-Medina, Antonio & Triossi, Matteo, 2017. "Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets," UC3M Working papers. Economics 26081, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.

  5. Fonseca-Mairena, María Haydée & Triossi, Matteo, 2019. "Incentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Romero-Medina, Antonio & Triossi, Matteo, 2014. "Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 624-630.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  7. Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2013. "Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(3), pages 701-720, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Romero-Medina, Antonio & Triossi, Matteo, 2017. "Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets," UC3M Working papers. Economics 26081, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    2. Akahoshi, Takashi, 2014. "Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 7-13.
    3. Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2011. "Acyclicity and Singleton Cores in Matching Markets," Documentos de Trabajo 281, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    4. Bó, Inácio & Heller, C.-Philipp, 2016. "Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2016-204, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    5. EHLERS, Lars, 2009. "Manipulation via Capacities Revisited," Cahiers de recherche 04-2009, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    6. Hagen, Martin, 2022. "Tradable immigration quotas revisited," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    7. Assaf Romm, 2014. "Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(4), pages 851-875, December.
    8. Tello Benjamín, 2018. "Stability of Equilibrium Outcomes under Deferred Acceptance: Acyclicity and Dropping Strategies," Working Papers 2018-05, Banco de México.

  8. Triossi, Matteo, 2013. "Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 169-191.

    Cited by:

    1. Guha Brishti, 2020. "Pretrial Beliefs and Verdict Accuracy: Costly Juror Effort and Free Riding," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(2), pages 1-9, June.
    2. Guha Brishti, 2020. "Should Jurors Deliberate?," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 1-27, July.
    3. Guha, Brishti, 2018. "Secret ballots and costly information gathering: The jury size problem revisited," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 58-67.
    4. Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2020. "Appointed Learning for the Common Good: Optimal Committee Size and Efficient Rewards," CEPR Discussion Papers 15311, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2022. "Appointed learning for the common good: Optimal committee size and monetary transfers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 153-176.
    6. Jun Chen, 2021. "The Condorcet Jury Theorem with Information Acquisition," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(4), pages 1-33, October.
    7. Guha, Brishti, 2017. "Should Jurors Deliberate?," MPRA Paper 79876, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Joseph McMurray, 2015. "The paradox of information and voter turnout," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 165(1), pages 13-23, October.
    9. Helios Herrera & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Joseph C. McMurray, 2016. "The Marginal Voter's Curse," Working Papers 798, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    10. Guha, Brishti, 2022. "Ambiguity aversion, group size, and deliberation: Costly information and decision accuracy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 201(C), pages 115-133.

  9. Romero-Medina, Antonio & Triossi, Matteo, 2013. "Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 237-239.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  10. Triossi, Matteo, 2009. "Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 566-575, May.

    Cited by:

    1. BONKOUNGOU, Somouaoga, 2016. "Pareto dominance of deferred acceptance through early decision," Cahiers de recherche 2016-07, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    2. Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2017. "Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets," Documentos de Trabajo 328, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    3. Bó, Inácio Guerberoff Lanari & Hakimov, Rustamdjan, 2016. "The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2016-212, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    4. Alfredo Salgado-Torres, 2012. "A simple decentralized matching mechanism in markets with couples," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(3), pages 2044-2055.
    5. Matteo Triossi & Antonio Romero-Medina, 2010. "Non-revelation Mechanisms in Many-to-One Markets," Documentos de Trabajo 273, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    6. Salgado Alfredo, 2018. "Incomplete Information and Costly Signaling in College Admissions," Working Papers 2018-23, Banco de México.
    7. Alcalde, José, 2018. "Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (Hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 32-49.
    8. Somouaoga BONKOUNGOU, 2016. "Pareto Dominance of Deferred Acceptance through Early Decision," Cahiers de recherche 11-2016, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    9. Yasushi Kawase & Keisuke Bando, 2021. "Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(2), pages 503-546, June.

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Featured entries

This author is featured on the following reading lists, publication compilations, Wikipedia, or ReplicationWiki entries:
  1. Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Economics PhD Alumni

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 23 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (16) 2006-09-30 2006-09-30 2007-09-02 2007-10-27 2010-09-25 2011-01-16 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 2011-11-14 2011-11-14 2017-03-19 2017-10-01 2018-01-01 2018-08-13 2018-08-13 2018-09-24. Author is listed
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (6) 2007-09-02 2007-10-27 2011-11-14 2017-03-19 2018-01-01 2018-09-24. Author is listed
  3. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (5) 2006-09-30 2006-09-30 2008-02-02 2010-03-28 2013-08-16. Author is listed
  4. NEP-DES: Economic Design (5) 2018-01-01 2018-07-30 2018-08-13 2018-08-13 2018-09-24. Author is listed
  5. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (5) 2006-09-30 2008-02-02 2010-03-28 2013-08-16 2015-02-16. Author is listed
  6. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (2) 2018-01-01 2018-07-30
  7. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (2) 2007-09-02 2007-10-27
  8. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2017-03-19
  9. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (1) 2007-10-27
  10. NEP-KNM: Knowledge Management and Knowledge Economy (1) 2006-09-30
  11. NEP-LAM: Central and South America (1) 2020-01-27
  12. NEP-PPM: Project, Program and Portfolio Management (1) 2020-01-27
  13. NEP-SPO: Sports and Economics (1) 2013-08-16

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