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Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent

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  • Luis Corchón
  • Matteo Triossi

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Abstract

In this paper, we present a model of implementation where infeasible allocations are converted into feasible ones through a process of renegotiation that is represented by a reversion function. We describe the maximal set of Social Choice Correspondences that can be implemented in Nash Equilibrium in a class of reversion functions that punish agents for infeasibilities. This is used to study the implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence and several axiomatic solutions to problems of bargaining and taxation.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile in its series Documentos de Trabajo with number 255.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:edj:ceauch:255

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  1. Grandmont Jean-michel & Laroque Guy, 1974. "On temporary keynesian equilibria," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 7406, CEPREMAP.
  2. Postlewaite, Andrew, 1979. "Manipulation via Endowments," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 255-62, April.
  3. Hong, Lu, 1995. "Nash Implementation in Production Economies," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 401-17, May.
  4. Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1999. "Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods," Economic theory and game theory 009, Nir Dagan.
  5. Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano, 1997. "Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games," Economics Working Papers 217, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  6. Maskin, Eric, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January.
  7. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
  8. Murat Atlamaz & Bettina Klaus, 2003. "Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 598.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  9. Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2001. "Voluntary Implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 1-25, May.
  10. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1990. "Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1083-99, September.
  11. Eric Maskin & John Moore, 1999. "Implementation and Renegotiation," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1863, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  12. Silvestre, Joaquim, 1982. "Fixprice analysis in exchange economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 28-58, February.
  13. Serrano, Roberto, 1997. "A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 203-208, August.
  14. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 1997. "Non-cooperative implementation of the core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 513-525.
  15. Tian Guoqiang & Li Qi, 1995. "On Nash-Implementation in the Presence of Withholding," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 222-233, May.
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