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Games with Capacity Manipulation: Incentives and Nash Equilibria

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  • Antonio Romero-Medina
  • Matteo Triossi

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Abstract

Studying the interaction between preference and capacity manipulation in matching markets, we prove that acyclicity is a necessary and su!cient condition that guarantees the stability of a Nash equilibrium and the strategy-proofness of truthful capacity revelation under the hospital-optimal and intern-optimal stable rules. we then introduce generalized capacity manipulations games where hospitals move first and state their capacities, and interns are subsequently assigned to hospitals using a sequential mechanism. In this setting, we first consider stable revelation mechanisms and introduce conditions guaranteeing the stability of the outcome. Next, we prove that every stable non-revelation mechanism leads to unstable allocations, unless restrictions on the preferences of the agents are introduced. JEL Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D71, D78.

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Paper provided by Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile in its series Documentos de Trabajo with number 280.

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Date of creation: 2011
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Handle: RePEc:edj:ceauch:280

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Cited by:
  1. Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2011. "Acyclicity and Singleton Cores in Matching Markets," Documentos de Trabajo 281, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  2. Ehlers, Lars, 2010. "Manipulation via capacities revisited," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 302-311, July.

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