Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket
AbstractIn this paper, we study many-to-one matching (hospital-intern markets) with an aftermarket. We analyze the Nash equilibria of capacity allocation games, in which preferences of hospitals and interns are common knowledge and every hospital determines a quota for the regular market given its total capacity for the two matching periods. Under the intern-optimal stable matching system, we show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium may not exist. Common preferences for hospitals ensure the existence of equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies whereas unlike in games of capacity manipulation strong monotonicity of population is not a sufficient restriction on preferences to avoid the nonexistence problem. Besides, in games of capacity allocation, it is not true either that every hospital weakly prefers a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium to any larger regular market quota profiles.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 33 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Mumcu, Ayse & Saglam, Ismail, 2008. "Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket," MPRA Paper 9239, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ayse Mumcu & Ismail Saglam, 2008. "Games of Capacity Allocation in Many-to-One Matching with an Aftermarket," Working Papers, TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics 0802, TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics.
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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