Mixed Strategies in Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital–Intern Markets
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 27 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (August)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2005.
"The New York City High School Match,"
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Boston College Working Papers in Economics
515, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 31 Jul 2002.
- Hideo Konishi & M. Ünver, 2006. "Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital-intern Markets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 3-24, August.
- Ayse Mumcu & Ismail Saglam, 2008.
"Games of Capacity Allocation in Many-to-One Matching with an Aftermarket,"
0802, TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics.
- Ayşe Mumcu & Ismail Saglam, 2009. "Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 383-403, September.
- Mumcu, Ayse & Saglam, Ismail, 2008. "Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket," MPRA Paper 9239, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Mustafa Afacan, 2013. "The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 139-151, May.
- Ehlers, Lars, 2010.
"Manipulation via capacities revisited,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 302-311, July.
- EHLERS, Lars, 2009. "Manipulation via Capacities Revisited," Cahiers de recherche 2009-03, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- EHLERS, Lars, 2009. "Manipulation via Capacities Revisited," Cahiers de recherche 04-2009, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Onur Kesten, 2012. "On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 677-693, November.
- Fuhito Kojima & Parag A. Pathak, 2009. "Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 608-27, June.
- Azevedo, Eduardo M., 2014. "Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 207-223.
- Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2013. "Application fee manipulations in matching markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 446-453.
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