Stability, efficiency and monotonicity in two-sided matching
Abstractwe propose a fairness property called P-monotonicity that we would like a matching mechanism to satisfy. We show that it is impossible to have a mechanism which is both stable and P- monotonic. Moreover, we show that it is impossible to have a mechanism which is both efficient and P-monotonic.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 37215.
Date of creation: 09 Mar 2012
Date of revision:
Stability; Efficiency; Monotonicity; Two-Sided Matching;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-03-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2012-03-28 (Game Theory)
- NEP-NET-2012-03-28 (Network Economics)
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