Games of Capacity Allocation in Many-to-One Matching with an Aftermarket
AbstractIn this paper, we study many-to-one matching (hospital-intern markets) with an aftermarket. We analyze the Nash equilibria of capacity allocation games, in which preferences of hospitals and interns are common knowledge and every hospital determines a quota for the regular market given its total capacity for the two matching periods. Under the intern-optimal stable matching system, we show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium may not exist. Common preferences for hospitals ensure the existence of equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies whereas unlike in games of capacity manipulation strong monotonicity of population is not a sufficient restriction on preferences to avoid the nonexistence problem. Besides, in games of capacity allocation, it is not true either that every hospital weakly prefers a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium to any larger regular market quota profiles.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0802.
Date of creation: Jul 2008
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Ayşe Mumcu & Ismail Saglam, 2009. "Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 383-403, September.
- Mumcu, Ayse & Saglam, Ismail, 2008. "Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket," MPRA Paper 9239, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-07-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2008-07-20 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2008-07-20 (Game Theory)
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