Revealed Ambiguity and Its Consequences: Updating
AbstractWe study the updating of beliefs under ambiguity for invariant biseparable preferences. In particular, we show that a natural form of dynamic consistency characterizes the Bayesian updating of these beliefs.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Collegio Carlo Alberto in its series Carlo Alberto Notebooks with number 44.
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-05-19 (All new papers)
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- Cesaltina Pacheco Pires, 2002. "A Rule For Updating Ambiguous Beliefs," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 137-152, September.
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- Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2007. "Games of Capacities: A (Close) Look to Nash Equilibria," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 52, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2011. "Games with capacity manipulation : incentives and Nash equilibria," Economics Working Papers we1125, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
- Adam Dominiak & Jean-Philippe Lefort, 2011.
"Unambiguous events and dynamic Choquet preferences,"
Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 401-425, April.
- Dominiak, Adam & Lefort, Jean-Philippe, 2009. "Unambiguous Events and Dynamic Choquet Preferences," Working Papers 0489, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
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