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On the Efficiency Costs of De-tracking Secondary Schools

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  • Ariga, Kenn

    ()
    (Kyoto University)

  • Brunello, Giorgio

    ()
    (University of Padova)

  • Iwahashi, Roki

    ()
    (University of the Ryukyus, Okinawa)

  • Rocco, Lorenzo

    ()
    (University of Padova)

Abstract

During the postwar period, many countries have de-tracked their secondary schools, based on the view that early tracking was unfair. What are the efficiency costs, if any, of de-tracking schools? To answer this question, we develop a two skills - two jobs model with a frictional labour market, where new school graduates need to actively search for their best match. We compute optimal tracking length and the output gain/loss associated to the gap between actual and optimal tracking length. Using a sample of 18 countries, we find that: a) actual tracking length is often longer than optimal, which might call for some efficient de-tracking; b) the output loss of having a tracking length longer or shorter than optimal is sizeable, and close to 2 percent of total net output.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 2534.

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Length: 58 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2534

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Keywords: mismatch; school tracking;

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References

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  1. Eric A. Hanushek & Ludger Wößmann, 2005. "Does Education Tracking Affect Performance and Inequality? Differences-In-Differences Evidence Across Countries," Discussion Papers 04-027, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  2. Lamo, Ana & Messina, Julián & Wasmer, Etienne, 2011. "Are specific skills an obstacle to labor market adjustment?," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 240-256, April.
  3. James J. Heckman & Jora Stixrud & Sergio Urzua, 2006. "The Effects of Cognitive and Noncognitive Abilities on Labor Market Outcomes and Social Behavior," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 411-482, July.
  4. David Card & Alan Krueger, 1990. "Does School Quality Matter? Returns to Education and the Characteristics of Public Schools in the United States," Working Papers 645, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
  5. Roland Benabou, 2002. "Tax and Education Policy in a Heterogeneous-Agent Economy: What Levels of Redistribution Maximize Growth and Efficiency?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 481-517, March.
  6. Ariga, Kenn & Brunello, Giorgio & Iwahashi, Roki & Rocco, Lorenzo, 2005. "Why Is the Timing of School Tracking So Heterogeneous?," IZA Discussion Papers 1854, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  7. Brunello, Giorgio & Giannini, Massimo & Ariga, Kenn, 2004. "The Optimal Timing of School Tracking," IZA Discussion Papers 995, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  8. Meghir, Costas & Palme, Mårten, 1999. "Assessing the Effect of Schooling on Earnings Using a Social Experiment," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 313, Stockholm School of Economics.
  9. Yashiv, E., 1999. "The Determinants of Equilibrium Unemployment," Papers 36-99, Tel Aviv.
  10. James W. Albrecht & Pieter A. Gautier & Susan B. Vroman, 2001. "Matching with Multiple Applications," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 01-080/3, Tinbergen Institute.
  11. Hanushek, Eric A. & Leung, Charles Ka Yui & Yilmaz, Kuzey, 2003. "Redistribution through education and other transfer mechanisms," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(8), pages 1719-1750, November.
  12. Caroline Hoxby, 2000. "Peer Effects in the Classroom: Learning from Gender and Race Variation," NBER Working Papers 7867, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Richard Rogerson & Robert Shimer & Randall Wright, 2004. "Search-Theoretic Models of the Labor Market-A Survey," NBER Working Papers 10655, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Giorgio Brunello & Daniele Checchi, 2007. "Does school tracking affect equality of opportunity? New international evidence," Economic Policy, CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 22, pages 781-861, October.
  15. Alain Delacroix & Shouyong Shi, 2003. "Directed Search On the Job and the Wage Ladder," Working Papers shouyong-03-04, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00646594 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Ferreira, Francisco H. G. & Gignoux, Jérémie, 2011. "The Measurement of Educational Inequality: Achievement and Opportunity," IZA Discussion Papers 6161, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. Pamela Giustinelli, 2011. "Group Decision Making with Uncertain Outcomes: Unpacking Child-Parent Choices of High School Tracks," Working Papers 2011-030, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
  4. Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2011. "Games with capacity manipulation : incentives and Nash equilibria," Economics Working Papers we1125, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  5. Florentino Felgueroso & Maria Gutiérrez-Domènech & Sergi Jiménez-Martín, 2014. "Dropout trends and educational reforms: the role of the LOGSE in Spain," IZA Journal of Labor Policy, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 1-24, December.
  6. repec:hal:psewpa:halshs-00646594 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Felgueroso, Florentino & Gutiérrez-Domenech, María & Jiménez Martín, Sergi, 2013. "¿Por qué el abandono escolar se ha mantenido tan elevado en España en las últimas dos décadas? El papel de la Ley de Educación (LOGSE)," Economic Reports 02-2013, FEDEA.
  8. Volker Meier & Gabriela Schütz, 2007. "The Economics of Tracking and Non-Tracking," Ifo Working Paper Series Ifo Working Papers No. 50, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.

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