Reliability and Responsibility: A Theory of Endogenous Commitment
AbstractA common assumption in Political Science literature is policy commitment: candidates maintain their electoral promises. We drop such assumption and we show that costless electoral campaign can be an effective way of transmitting information to voters. The result is robust to relevant equilibrium refinements. An unavoidable proportion of ambiguous politicians emerges.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Collegio Carlo Alberto in its series Carlo Alberto Notebooks with number 21.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Information Transmission; Electoral Campaign; Endogenous Commitment.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-09-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2006-09-30 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-KNM-2006-09-30 (Knowledge Management & Knowledge Economy)
- NEP-POL-2006-09-30 (Positive Political Economics)
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