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Political tenure, term limits and corruption

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  • Tsur, Yacov

Abstract

Political tenure (experience) is a double-edged sword: expediting government performance, while increasing political power with potentially harmful (corruption) ramifications. Within a voters–politician interaction framework, I unravel these two effects of political tenure on voters’ welfare and examine how term limits affect these relations. It is shown that the key factors affecting the tenure–welfare relation are the learning curve of incumbents in conducting their regular task (public goods provision) and the learning curve of opportunistic incumbents in becoming effective embezzlers. I find that stricter term limits increase the frequency of corruption incidents but reduce the expected cost per incident. The expected cost of corruption is shown to depend on three factors which respond differently to term limits. Implications for policies aimed at reducing corruption are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Tsur, Yacov, 2022. "Political tenure, term limits and corruption," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:74:y:2022:i:c:s0176268021001348
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102166
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Democracy; Reelection; Signaling; Term limits; Corruption;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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