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Disclosure by Politicians

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Author Info
Simeon Djankov
Rafael La Porta
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes
Andrei Shleifer

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Abstract

We collect data on the rules and practices of financial and conflict disclosure by politicians in 175 countries. Although two thirds of the countries have some disclosure laws, less than a third make disclosures available to the public. Disclosure is more extensive in richer and more democratic countries. Disclosure is correlated with lower perceived corruption when it is public, when it identifies sources of income and conflicts of interest, and when a country is a democracy.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 14703.

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Date of creation: Feb 2009
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14703

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism

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    Other versions:
  3. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 1999. "The Quality of Government," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 222-79, April.
    Other versions:
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    Other versions:
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    Other versions:
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