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Ramón y Cajal: Mediation and Meritocracy

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Author Info
Matteo Triossi
Antonio Romero-Medina

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Abstract

The Ramón y Cajal Program promotes the hiring of top researchers in Spanish R&D centers and academic institutions. The centralized mechanism associated to the Program is analyzed. The paper models it as a two-sided matching market and studies if it provides the incentives to increase the quality of the researchers hired. We analyze the mechanism both under complete and incomplete information. The comparison of the theoretical findings with the available data points out that the mechanism provides poor incentives and does not prevent collusion between research departments and candidates in the hiring process.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Collegio Carlo Alberto in its series Carlo Alberto Notebooks with number 22.

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Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cca:wpaper:22

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Related research
Keywords: Matching Markets; Preagreements; Implementation.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Roth, Alvin E & Xing, Xiaolin, 1997. "Turnaround Time and Bottlenecks in Market Clearing: Decentralized Matching in the Market for Clinical Psychologists," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 284-329, April.
  2. Marilda Sotomayor, 2003. "Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 241-251, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Alcalde, Jose & Perez-Castrillo, David & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 1998. "Hiring Procedures to Implement Stable Allocations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 469-480, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Alcalde, Jose & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2005. "Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 153-158, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Alcalde, Jose & Barbera, Salvador, 1994. "Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 417-35, May.
    Other versions:
  6. Roth, Alvin E., 1985. "The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 277-288, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Alcalde, Jose, 1996. "Implementation of Stable Solutions to Marriage Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 240-254, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Martinez, Ruth & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro & Oviedo, Jorge, 2000. "Single Agents and the Set of Many-to-One Stable Matchings," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 91-105, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Tayfun Sönmez & Tarik Kara, 1997. "Implementation of college admission rules (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 197-218.
  10. Ehlers, Lars, 2004. "In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 249-270, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Roth, Alvin E & Xing, Xiaolin, 1994. "Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 992-1044, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Roth, Alvin E., 1984. "Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 383-387, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Joana Pais, 2006. "On Random Matching Markets: Properties and Equilibria," Working Papers 2006/11, Department of Economics at the School of Economics and Management (ISEG), Technical University of Lisbon.. [Downloadable!]
  14. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 991-1016, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Alcalde, Jose & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2000. "Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admissions Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 294-302, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Alvin E. Roth, 2002. "The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1341-1378, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Balinski, Michel & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 73-94, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Alvin E. Roth & Uriel G. Rothblum, 1999. "Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets--In Search of Advice for Participants," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(1), pages 21-44, January.
  19. Eisenberg, Theodore & Wells, Martin T, 2000. "Inbreeding in Law School Hiring: Assessing the Performance of Faculty Hired from Within," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(1), pages 369-88, January.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Paolo Ghirardato & Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci, 2007. "Revealed Ambiguity and Its Consequences: Updating," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 44, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
  2. Daron Acemoglu & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2008. "A Theory of Military Dictatorships," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 74, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Daron Acemoglu & Victor Chernozhukov & Muhamet Yildiz, 2007. "Learning and Disagreement in an Uncertain World," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 48, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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