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Neutral Mergers Between Bilateral Markets

Author

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  • Antonio Romero-Medina
  • Matteo Triossi

Abstract

We study the consequences of bilateral market mergers. We first characterize the relationship between the M-optimal stable matching in the original markets with the M-optimal stable matching in the new market formed after the merger of the original markets. Then, we characterize the conditions under which the Cartesian product of the set of stable matching in each of the original markets remain stable in the new market. Key words: Two-sided Matching, Stable Matching Mergers, Comparative Statics.

Suggested Citation

  • Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2012. "Neutral Mergers Between Bilateral Markets," Documentos de Trabajo 292, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    • Handle: RePEc:edj:ceauch:292
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    References listed on IDEAS

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