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Restabilizing matching markets at senior level

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  • Cantala, David

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 48 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 1-17

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:48:y:2004:i:1:p:1-17

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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References

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  1. Mo, Jie-Ping, 1988. "Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 66-96, October.
  2. Crawford, Vincent P & Knoer, Elsie Marie, 1981. "Job Matching with Heterogeneous Firms and Workers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 49(2), pages 437-50, March.
  3. Martinez, Ruth & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro & Oviedo, Jorge, 2000. "Single Agents and the Set of Many-to-One Stable Matchings," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 91-105, March.
  4. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 47-57, January.
  5. Ahmet Alkan, 2001. "original papers : On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 99-111.
  6. Crawford, Vincent P., 1991. "Comparative statics in matching markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 389-400, August.
  7. Blum, Yosef & Roth, Alvin E. & Rothblum, Uriel G., 1997. "Vacancy Chains and Equilibration in Senior-Level Labor Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 362-411, October.
  8. Kelso, Alexander S, Jr & Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1483-1504, November.
  9. Sotomayor, Marilda, 1996. "A Non-constructive Elementary Proof of the Existence of Stable Marriages," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 135-137, March.
  10. Blum, Yosef & Rothblum, Uriel G., 2002. ""Timing Is Everything" and Marital Bliss," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 429-443, April.
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Cited by:
  1. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2004:i:45:p:1-11 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Francis Bloch & David Cantala, 2010. "Markovian assignment rules," Serie documentos de trabajo del Centro de Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos 2010-18, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos.
  3. Boyle, Elette & Echenique, Federico, 2007. "Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 1269, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  4. Fuhito Kojima & Parag A. Pathak, 2009. "Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 608-27, June.
  5. Péter Biró & Katarína Cechlárová & Tamás Fleiner, 2008. "The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 333-352, March.
  6. David Cantala, 2011. "Agreement toward stability in matching markets," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 293-316, December.
  7. Raïssa-Juvette Samba Zitou & Rhonya Adli, 2012. "Quasi stable outcomes in the assignment game," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 72(3), pages 323-340, March.

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