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Competition and Resource Sensitivity in Marriage and Roommate Markets

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  • Bettina Klaus

    ()
    (Harvard Business School, Negotiation, Organizations & Markets Unit)

Abstract

We consider one-to-one matching markets in which agents can either be matched as pairs or remain single. In these so-called roommate markets agents are consumers and resources at the same time. We investigate two new properties that capture the effect a newcomer has on incumbent agents. Competition sensitivity focuses on the newcomer as additional consumer and requires that some incumbents will suffer if competition is caused by a newcomer. Resource sensitivity focuses on the newcomer as additional resource and requires that this is beneficial for some incumbents. For solvable roommate markets, we provide the first characterizations of the core using either competition or resource sensitivity. On the domain of all roommate markets, we obtain two associated impossibility results.

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File URL: http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/09-072.pdf
File Function: Revised version, 2008
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Harvard Business School in its series Harvard Business School Working Papers with number 09-072.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2007
Date of revision: Dec 2008
Handle: RePEc:hbs:wpaper:09-072

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Related research

Keywords: Core; Matching; Competition Sensitivity; Resource Sensitivity; Roommate Market.;

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References

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  1. Burak Can & Bettina Klaus, 2010. "Consistency and Population Sensitivity Properties in Marriage and Roommate Markets," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 10.08, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  2. Barbera, S. & Bossert, W. & Pattanaik, P.K., 2001. "Ranking Sets of Objects," Cahiers de recherche 2001-02, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  3. William Thomson, 2007. "Fair Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 539, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  4. Roth,Alvin E. & Sotomayor,Marilda A. Oliveira, 1992. "Two-Sided Matching," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521437882, April.
  5. Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  6. Sonmez, T., 1995. "Implementation in Generalized Matching Problems," Papers 95-03, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
  7. Manabu Toda, 2006. "Monotonicity and Consistency in Matching Markets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 13-31, April.
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Cited by:
  1. Burak Can & Bettina Klaus, 2013. "Consistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and roommate markets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 41(4), pages 835-862, October.
  2. Thayer Morrill, 2013. "An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 19-28, February.

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