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Priorities in the Location of Multiple Public Facilities

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  • BOCHET, Olivier
  • GORDON, Sidartha

Abstract

A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number k of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not su¤er from congestion and are non-excludable. We provide a characterization of the class of rules satisfying Pareto-efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each rule in the class is a priority rule that selects locations according to a predetermined priority ordering among interest groups. We characterize each of the subclasses of priority rules that respectively satisfy anonymity, hiding-proofness and strategy-proofness. In particular, we prove that a priority rule is strategy-proof if and only if it partitions the set of agents into a fixed hierarchy. Alternatively, any such rule can be viewed as a collection of fixed-populations generalized peak-selection median rules (Moulin, 1980), that are linked across populations, in a way that we describe.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 2008-07.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mtl:montde:2008-07

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Keywords: Multie blic facilities; Priority rules; Hierarchical rules; Object-lation-monotonicity; Sovereignty; Anonymity; Strategy-oofness; Generalized median rules; Hiding-oofness.;

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References

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  1. Barbera, S. & Sonnenschein, H., 1988. "Voting By Quota And Committee," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 95-88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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  15. BOCHET, Olivier & GORDON, Sidartha, 2008. "Priorities in the Location of Multiple Public Facilities," Cahiers de recherche 07-2008, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  16. Moulin, Herve, 1987. "The Pure Compensation Problem: Egalitarianism versus Laissez-Fairism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(4), pages 769-83, November.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Eun Heo, 2013. "Strategy-proof rules for two public goods: double median rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 41(4), pages 895-922, October.
  2. Sidartha Gordon & Olivier Bochet & René Saran, 2013. "Weighted Majoritarian Rules for the Location of Multiple Public Facilities," Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers 2013-15, Sciences Po Departement of Economics.
  3. BOCHET, Olivier & GORDON, Sidartha, 2008. "Priorities in the Location of Multiple Public Facilities," Cahiers de recherche 07-2008, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  4. Masashi Umezawa, 2012. "The replacement principle for the provision of multiple public goods on tree networks," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 211-235, February.

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