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Efficiency and Consistency for Locating Multiple Public Facilities

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  • Biung-Ghi Ju

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Korea University)

Abstract

In the problem of locating multiple public facilities studied by Barbera and Bevia [2, 3], we offer simple necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency, decentralizability of efficient decisions in a game of community division and local public goods provision, and a constructive algorithm for efficient and consistent decisions.

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File URL: http://econ.korea.ac.kr/~ri/WorkingPapers/W0716.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Korea University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number 0716.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iek:wpaper:0716

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Keywords: Efficiency; Consistency; Self-selection consistency; No-envy; Local stability; Diversity; Strong Nash equilibrium; Community division; Location;

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References

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  1. EHLERS, Lars, 2001. "Multiple Public Goods and Lexicographic Preferences Replacement Principle," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques 2001-25, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  2. KONISHI, Hideo & LE BRETON, Michel & WEBER, Shlomo, . "On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -1383, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Eiichi Miyagawa, 2001. "Locating libraries on a street," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 527-541.
  4. Carmen Bevi? & Salvador Barber?, . "Self-Selection Consistent Functions," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 468.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  5. Moulin, Herve, 1994. "Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(2), pages 305-25, April.
  6. Konishi, Hideo & Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 1997. "Equilibria in a Model with Partial Rivalry," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 225-237, January.
  7. Salvador Barberà & Carmen Beviá, 2002. "Locating Public Facilities by Majority: Stability, Consistency and Group Formation," Working Papers, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics 128, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  8. Moulin, Herve & Shenker, Scott, 1992. "Serial Cost Sharing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1009-37, September.
  9. Konishi, Hideo & Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 1998. "Equilibrium in a Finite Local Public Goods Economy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 224-244, April.
  10. Ehlers, Lars, 2003. "Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-27, April.
  11. Konishi, Hideo & Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 1997. "Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in a Group Formation Game with Positive Externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 161-182, October.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. William Thomson, 2011. "Consistency and its converse: an introduction," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 257-291, December.
  2. BOCHET, Olivier & GORDON, Sidartha, 2008. "Priorities in the Location of Multiple Public Facilities," Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ 07-2008, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  3. Bochet, Olivier & Gordon, Sidartha & Saran, Rene, 2013. "Weighted majoritarian rules for the location of multiple public facilities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 454-459.
  4. Eun Heo, 2013. "Strategy-proof rules for two public goods: double median rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 41(4), pages 895-922, October.
  5. Masashi Umezawa, 2012. "The replacement principle for the provision of multiple public goods on tree networks," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 211-235, February.

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