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Self-Selection Consistent Choices

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  • Salvador Barbera

    (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona)

  • Carmen Bevia

    (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona)

Abstract

This paper studies collective choice rules whose outcomes consist of a collection of simultaneous decisions, each one of which is the only concern of some group of individuals in society. The need for such rules arises in different contexts, including the establishment of jurisdictions, the location of multiple public facilities, or the election of representative committees. We define a notion of allocation consistency requiring that each partial aspect of the global decision taken by society as a whole should be ratified by the group of agents who are directly concerned with this particular aspect. We investigate the possibility of designing allocation consistent rules which satisfy the Condorcet criterion and respect different notions of voluntarism.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers with number 1322.

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Date of creation: 01 Aug 2000
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1322

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  1. Greenberg, J. & Weber, S., 1991. "Stable Coalition Structure with Unidimensional Set of Alternatives," Papers 91-11, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
  2. Igal Milchtaich & Eyal Winter, 2000. "Stability and Segregation in Group Formation," Discussion Paper Series dp263, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  3. Alberto Alesina & Enrico Spolaore, 1995. "On the Number and Size of Nations," NBER Working Papers 5050, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. William Thomson, 2011. "Consistency and its converse: an introduction," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 257-291, December.
  5. Philippe JEHIEL & Suzanne SCOTCHMER, 1997. "Free Mobility and the Optimal Number of Jurisdictions," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 45, pages 219-231.
  6. Greenberg Joseph & Weber Shlomo, 1993. "Stable Coalition Structures with a Unidimensional Set of Alternatives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 62-82, June.
  7. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February.
  8. Konishi, Hideo & Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 1998. "Equilibrium in a Finite Local Public Goods Economy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 224-244, April.
  9. Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi & Tayfun Sonmez, 1999. "Core in a Simple Coalition Formation Game," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 449, Boston College Department of Economics.
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