Self-Selective Social Choice Functions
AbstractIt is not uncommon that a society facing a choice problem has also to choose the choice rule itself. In such situation voters’ preferences on alternatives induce preferences over the voting rules. Such a setting immediately gives rise to a natural question concerning consistency between these two levels of choice. If a choice rule employed to resolve the society’s original choice problem does not choose itself when it is also used in choosing the choice rule, then this phenomenon can be regarded as inconsistency of this choice rule as it rejects itself according to its own rationale. Koray (2000) proved that the only neutral, unanimous universally self-selective social choice functions are the dictatorial ones. Here we in troduce to our society a constitution, which rules out inefficient social choice rules. When inefficient social choice rules become unavailable for comparison, the property of self-selectivity becomes weaker and we show that some non-trivial self-selective social choice functions do exist. Under certain assumptions on the constitution we describe all of them.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 2006-21.
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 2006
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social choice function; social choice corresndence; self-selectivity; resistance to cloning;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-12-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2006-12-09 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DCM-2006-12-09 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-POL-2006-12-09 (Positive Political Economics)
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