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Flexible Majority Rules

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Author Info
Ulrich Erlenmaier
Hans Gersbach ()

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Abstract

In this paper we introduce flexible majority decision rules where the size of the majority depends on the proposal made by the agenda setter. Flexible majority rules can mitigate the disadvantages of democracies in the provision of public projects. In many cases, the combination of the principles taxation constraint to majority winners, a ban on subsidies, costly agenda setting and flexible majority rules constitute a socially optimal democratic constitution. Flexible majority rules might also be a useful decision-making procedure in other circumstances.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number CESifo Working Paper No. 464.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_464

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Related research
Keywords: Flexible majority rules; incomplete social contract; constitutional treatment rules; provision of public projects;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Piketty, Thomas, 1999. "The information-aggregation approach to political institutions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 791-800, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1996. "Industrial policy and politics," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 1-27. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. John C. Harsanyi, 1955. "Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63, pages 309. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Roger B. Myerson, 1994. "Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Discussion Papers 1103, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Guttman, Joel M., 1998. "Unanimity and majority rule: the calculus of consent reconsidered," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 189-207, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson, 2002. "Choosing How to Choose: Self Stable Majority Rules," Microeconomics 0211003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  8. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1994. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," Discussion Papers 1117, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Bard Harstad, 2006. "Flexible Integration," Discussion Papers 1428, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  2. Hans Gersbach, 2002. "Democratic Mechanisms: Double Majority Rules and Flexible Agenda Costs," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Gary-Bobo, Robert J., 2007. "On the Optimal Number of Representatives," CEPR Discussion Papers 6417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Hans Gersbach & Felix Mühe, 2008. "Vote-Buying and Growth," Economics working paper series 08/94, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
  5. Hans Gersbach & Lars Siemers, 2005. "Can Democracy Educate a Society?," IZA Discussion Papers 1693, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-3.

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