Choosing choices: Agenda selection with uncertain issues
AbstractThis paper studies selection rules i.e. the procedures committees use to choose whether to place an issue on their agenda. The main ingredient of the model is that committee members are uncertain about their final preferences at the selection stage: they only know the probability that they will eventually prefer the proposal to the status quo at the decision stage. This probability is private information. We find that a more stringent selection rule makes the voters more conservative. Hence individual behavior reinforces the effect of the rule instead of balancing it. For a voter, conditional on being pivotal, the probability that the proposal is adopted depends on which option she eventually favors. The probability that the proposal is adopted if she eventually prefers the proposal increases at a higher rate with the selection rule than if she eventually prefers the status quo. In order to compensate for that, the voters become more selective. The decision rule has the opposite effect. We describe optimal rules when there is a fixed cost of organizing the final election.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series PSE Working Papers with number halshs-00564976.
Date of creation: Nov 2010
Date of revision:
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00564976
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/
selection rules ; strategic voting ; asymmetric information ; agenda setting ; large deviations ; petitions ; citizens' initiative;
Other versions of this item:
- Raphael Godefroy & Eduardo Perez‐Richet, 2013. "Choosing Choices: Agenda Selection With Uncertain Issues," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(1), pages 221-253, 01.
- NEP-ALL-2011-02-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-02-19 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CIS-2011-02-19 (Confederation of Independent States)
- NEP-CTA-2011-02-19 (Contract Theory & Applications)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.