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Sequential voting in large elections with multiple candidates

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  • Hummel, Patrick
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    Abstract

    I analyze strategic voting incentives in large elections with three candidates when voting takes place sequentially. Voters have perfect information about their private preferences but do not know the distribution from which other voters' preferences are drawn. If a candidate finishes last in an early voting round, voters deduce that this candidate is likely to be less popular amongst the remaining voters, and the remaining voters almost always have an incentive to stop voting for this candidate. By contrast, sincere voting equilibria can exist under either simultaneous voting or an early voting round of sequential voting without knife-edge assumptions.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

    Volume (Year): 96 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 3 ()
    Pages: 341-348

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:96:y:2012:i:3:p:341-348

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

    Related research

    Keywords: Elections; Strategic voting; Multiple candidates; Sequential voting; Simultaneous voting;

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    References

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    1. Micael Castanheira, 2003. "Why Vote For Losers?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(5), pages 1207-1238, 09.
    2. Battaglini, Marco, 2004. "Sequential Voting with Abstention," Papers 05-19-2004, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy.
    3. Chamberlain, Gary & Rothschild, Michael, 1981. "A note on the probability of casting a decisive vote," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 152-162, August.
    4. Brian Knight & Nathan Schiff, 2007. "Momentum and Social Learning in Presidential Primaries," NBER Working Papers 13637, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Piketty, Thomas, 2000. "Voting as Communicating," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(1), pages 169-91, January.
    6. Steven Callander, 2007. "Bandwagons and Momentum in Sequential Voting," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(3), pages 653-684.
    7. Strumpf, Koleman S, 2002. " Strategic Competition in Sequential Election Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 111(3-4), pages 377-97, June.
    8. Mehmet Ekmekci, 2008. "Manipulation through political endorsements," Discussion Papers 1509, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    9. Richard Bensel & M. Sanders, 1979. "The effect of electoral rules on voting behavior: the electoral college and shift voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 69-85, March.
    10. Patrick Hummel, 2011. "Sequential Voting When Long Elections Are Costly," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(1), pages 36-58, 03.
    11. Klumpp, Tilman & Polborn, Mattias K., 2006. "Primaries and the New Hampshire Effect," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(6-7), pages 1073-1114, August.
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    Cited by:
    1. Patrick Hummel, 2014. "Pre-election polling and third party candidates," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 77-98, January.

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