Sequential Voting Procedures in Symmetric Binary Elections

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Sequential Voting Procedures in Symmetric Binary Elections

Author Info

Dekel, E.
Piccione, M.

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Eddie Dekel

Abstract

We explore sequential voting in symmetric two-option environments. We show that the (informative) symmetric equilibria of the simultaneous voting game are also equilibria in any sequential voting structure. In unanimity games, (essentially) the whole set of equilibria is the same in all sequential structures. We also explore the relationship between simultaneous and sequential voting in other contexts. We illustrate several instances where sequential voting does no better at aggregating information than simultaneous voting. The inability of the sequential structure to use additional information in voting models is distinct from that in the herd-cascade literature.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tel Aviv in its series Papers with number 3-99.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:teavfo:3-99

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Article
- Eddie Dekel & Michele Piccione, 2001. "Sequential Voting Procedures in Symmetric Binary Elections," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(1), pages 34-55, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paper
- Eddie Dekel & Michele Piccione, 1997. "On the Equivalence of Simultaneous and Sequential Binary Elections," Discussion Papers 1206, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

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