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Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources

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McKelvey, Richard D.
Ordeshook, Peter C.
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 36 (1985)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
Pages: 55-85
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:36:y:1985:i:1:p:55-85

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  1. Ordeshook, Peter C., 1991. "The Development of Contemporary Political Theory," Working Papers 762, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  2. Brian Knight & Nathan Schiff, 2007. "Momentum and Social Learning in Presidential Primaries," NBER Working Papers 13637, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Jens Großer & Arthur Schram, 2007. "Public Opinion Polls, Voter Turnout, and Welfare: An Experimental Study," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 014, University of Siena. [Downloadable!]
  4. Roger B. Myerson & Robert J. Weber, 1988. "A Theory of Voting Equilibria," Discussion Papers 782, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  5. Ledyard, John O., . "Information Aggregation in Two-Candidate Elections," Working Papers 685, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  6. Cesar Martinelli, 2000. "Simple Plurality versus Plurality Runoff with Privately Informed Voters," Working Papers 0004, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Ignacio Ortuño Ortín, 1999. "- A Model Of Voting With Incomplete Information And Opinion Polls," Working Papers. Serie AD 1999-25, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  8. Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2006. "Majority voting with stochastic preferences: The whims of a committee are smaller than the whims of its members," Working Papers DULBEA 06-05.RS, Université libre de Bruxelles, Department of Applied Economics (DULBEA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Luca Corazzini, Sebastian Kube, Michel André Maréchal, 2007. "Towards a Behavioral Public Choice: Guilt-Aversion and Accountability in the Lab," ISLA Working Papers 27, ISLA, Centre for research on Latin American Studies and Transition Economies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy. [Downloadable!]
  10. Martin Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2002. "A Sampling Equilibrium with an Application to Strategic Voting," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000037, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Luca Corazzini & Sebastian Kube & Michel André Maréchal & Antonio Nicoló, 2009. "Elections and Deceptions: Theory and Experimental Evidence," IEW - Working Papers iewwp421, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
  12. Adam Meirowitz, 2005. "Keeping the other candidate guessing: Electoral competition when preferences are private information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(3), pages 299-318, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Dhammika Dharmapala & Filip Palda, 2001. "Are Campaign Contributions a Form of Speech? Evidence from Recent US House Elections," Public Economics 0111007, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  14. John Chilton, 1998. "Strategic poll responses when elections create mandates," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 21-47, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1999. "Competing for Endorsements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 501-524, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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