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The information-aggregation approach to political institutions

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  • Piketty, Thomas

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 43 (1999)
Issue (Month): 4-6 (April)
Pages: 791-800

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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:43:y:1999:i:4-6:p:791-800

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References

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  1. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1560, David K. Levine.
  2. Persson, Torsten & Roland, Gerard & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Separation of powers and accountability: Towards a formal approach to comparative politics," Seminar Papers, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies 612, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  3. Abhijit Banerjee & Rohini Somanathan, 2001. "A Simple Model Of Voice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 116(1), pages 189-227, February.
  4. McKelvey, Richard D. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1985. "Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 55-85, June.
  5. Lohmann, Susanne, 1994. "Information Aggregation through Costly Political Action," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 518-30, June.
  6. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135.
  7. Feddersen, Timothy J & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1996. "The Swing Voter's Curse," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 408-24, June.
  8. Wittman, Donald, 1989. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1395-1424, December.
  9. Cukierman, A. & Tommasi, M., 1997. "When Does It Take a Nixon to Go to China," Papers, Tel Aviv 30-97, Tel Aviv.
  10. Peyton Young, 1995. "Optimal Voting Rules," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 51-64, Winter.
  11. Roger B. Myerson, 1994. "Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1103, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  12. Cukierman, Alex, 1991. " Asymmetric Information and the Electoral Momentum of Public Opinion Polls," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 70(2), pages 181-213, May.
  13. Edward J. Green, 1993. "On the emergence of parliamentary government: the role of private information," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 2-16.
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