This paper presents a model of strategic positioning during an election campaign in which candidates use results from opinion polls to extract information about voter preferences. It is shown that the distance between policy announcements decreases over the course of the campaign: candidates announce initial policies at either extreme of the political spectrum and commit to moderate final policies. An "underdog" effect arises: the difference in candidate popularity decreases as the campaign evolves. A puplic opinion poll constitutes a Pareto improvement if final policies are expected to become more moderate after the introduction of the poll.
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Paper provided by Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies in its series Seminar Papers with number
655.
Length: 42 pages Date of creation: 19 Oct 1998 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:hhs:iiessp:0655
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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