Extremism, Campaigning and Ambiguity
AbstractThis paper studies a model of how political parties use resources for campaigning to inform voters. We show existence of equilibrium under mild assumptions for an arbitrary number of parties. The main result is that if the parties are more extreme, then they spend less resources on campaigning (on average), compared with moderate parties. The reason is the following. Consider voters that are informed by one party only, say party 1. If both parties move closer to each other, then the actual and expected platform moves closer to the indifferent voters peak. By concavity of preferences, the increase in payoff of voting for the party that informed is bigger than the increase in payoff of voting for the other party. Thus, the previously indifferent voter now strictly prefers party 1. The effect makes parties gain more votes by informing when parties are moderate. Since spending increases, voters are (on average) more informed when parties are moderates.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Uppsala University, Department of Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 1999:9.
Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: 11 May 1999
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2004, pages 421-452.
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P. O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden
Phone: + 46 18 471 25 00
Fax: + 46 18 471 14 78
Web page: http://www.nek.uu.se/
More information through EDIRC
Political Parties; Campaigning;
Other versions of this item:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D89 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Other
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1999-07-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-1999-07-28 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-MIC-1999-07-28 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-1999-07-28 (Positive Political Economics)
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