1. Stephen Morris, 1999. "Political Correctness," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1242, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Stephen Morris, 2001. "Political Correctness," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 231-265, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Martin J. Osborne, 1995. "Spatial Models of Political Competition under Plurality Rule: A Survey of Some Explanations of the Number of Candidates and the Positions They Take," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(2), pages 261-301, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. : Christian Schultz, . "Polarization and Inefficient Policies," Discussion Papers 93-16, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics (formerly Institute of Economics).
   Other versions:
   • Schultz, Christian, 1996. "Polarization and Inefficient Policies," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(2), pages 331-44, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Ottaviani, Marco & Sorensen, Peter, 2001. "Information aggregation in debate: who should speak first?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(3), pages 393-421, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Schultz, Christian, 1995. " The Politics of Persuasion When Voters Are Rational," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 97(3), pages 357-68, September.
   Other versions:
   • : Christian Schultz, . "The Politics of Persuasion when Voters are Rational," Discussion Papers 93-15, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics (formerly Institute of Economics).
6. Timothy Besley & Rohini Pande, 1998. "Read My Lips: The Political Economy of Information Transmission," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 355, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Tim Besley & Rohini Pande, 1998. "Read my lips: the political economy of information transmission," IFS Working Papers W98/13, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
7. Kenneth Rogoff, 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," NBER Working Papers 2428, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Rogoff, Kenneth, 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 21-36, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1993. "Economic Policy, Economic Performance, and Elections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 27-42, March.
9. Marco Ottaviani & Peter Sorensen, 1999. "Professional Advice," Game Theory and Information 9906003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Ottaviani, Marco & Sorensen, Peter Norman, 2006. "Professional advice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 120-142, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Prendergast, Canice, 1993. "A Theory of "Yes Men."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 757-70, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Krishna, V. & Morgan, J., 1999. "A Model of Expertise," Papers 206, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
    Other versions:
    • Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1999. "A Model of Expertise," Working Papers 154, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Discussion Papers in Economics.. [Downloadable!]
    • Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1999. "A Model of Expertise," Game Theory and Information 9902003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    • Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 2001. "A Model Of Expertise," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(2), pages 747-775, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Schultz, Christian, 1999. "Monetary Policy, Delegation and Polarisation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(455), pages 164-78, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Christian Schultz, 1998. "Monetary Policy, Delegation and Polarization," Discussion Papers 98-17, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics (formerly Institute of Economics).
    • Christian Schultz, . "Monetary Policy, Delegation and Polarization," EPRU Working Paper Series 98-19, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics (formerly Institute of Economics).
13. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-51, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Cukierman, Alex & Tommasi, Mariano, 1998. "When Does It Take a Nixon to Go to China?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 180-97, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Mariano Tommasi, 1995. "Why Does it Take a Nixon to go to China?," UCLA Economics Working Papers 728, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Cukierman, A. & Tommasi, M., 1997. "When Does It Take a Nixon to Go to China," Papers 30-97, Tel Aviv.
15. Wilko Letterie & Otto H. Swank, 1998. "Economic Policy, Model Uncertainty and Elections," Economics and Politics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 10(1), pages 85-103, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Letterie, W.A. & Swank, O.H., 1993. "Economic Policy, Model Uncertainty and Elections," Papers 9307-p, Erasmus University of Rotterdam - Institute for Economic Research.
16. Marco Battaglini, 2000. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1557, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Marco Battaglini, 1999. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Discussion Papers 1295, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    • Marco Battaglini, 2002. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1379-1401, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Wittman, Donald, 1989. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1395-1424, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
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1. Frisell, Lars, 2004. "Populism," Working Paper Series 166, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden). [Downloadable!]
2. Marco Ottaviani & Peter Norman Sorensen, 2002. "Professional Advice: The Theory of Reputational Cheap Talk," Discussion Papers 02-05, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics (formerly Institute of Economics). [Downloadable!]
3. Jason G. Cummins & Ingmar Nyman, 2002. "The Dark Side of Competitive Pressure," Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers 02/3, Hunter College: Department of Economics, revised 2002. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Jason G. Cummins & Ingmar Nyman, 2002. "The dark side of competitive pressure," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2002-43, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
   • Jason G. Cummins & Ingmar Nyman, 2005. "The Dark Side of Competitive Pressure," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 361-397, Summer.
4. Lagerlöf, Johan N.M., 2003. "Are we Better Off if our Politicians Have More Information?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3884, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Johan Lagerlof, 2002. "Are We Better Off If Our Politicians Have More Information?," Public Economics 0209001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   • Johan Lagerl–f, 2004. "Are We Better Off if Our Politicians Have More Information?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 106(1), pages 123-142, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Santiago Sanchez-Pages & Marc Vorsatz, 2004. "An Experimental Study of Truth-Telling in a Sender-Receiver Game," ESE Discussion Papers 128, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Sanchez-Pages, Santiago & Vorsatz, Marc, 2007. "An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 86-112, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse Shapiro, 2005. "Media Bias and Reputation," NBER Working Papers 11664, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2006. "Media Bias and Reputation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(2), pages 280-316, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Ingmar Nyman & Jason G. Cummins, 2007. "“Yes-Men in Tournaments," Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers 417, Hunter College: Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
8. Ingmar Nyman & Jason G. Cummins, 2005. "Information Management in Rank-Order Tournaments," Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers 413, Hunter College: Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]