Intuitively, we associate different political parties with different types of policy. In contrast, this paper shows that, in the absence of differential costs of membership among parties (that is, if party membership is cheap talk), party labels cannot perfectly signal the ideologies of candidates. However, under certain conditions, parties can signal candidate types imperfectly. The paper, therefore, also provides an example of how costless communication can be effective in games of partial conflict. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 80 (1994) Issue (Month): 3-4 (September) Pages: 371-80 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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