Campaigning and Ambiguity when Parties Cannot Make Credible Election Promises
AbstractThis paper studies a model of how political parties use resources for campaigning to inform voters. Each party has a predetermined ideology drawn from some distribution. Parties choose a platform and campaign to inform voters about the platform. We find that, the farther away parties are from each other (on average), the less resources are spent on campaigning (on average). Thus, if parties are extreme, less information is supplied than if parties are moderate. We also show that if a public subsidy is introduced, we have policy convergence, given some mild technical restrictions on the public subsidy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Research Institute of Industrial Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 568.
Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: 20 Nov 2001
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Games and Economic Bahavior, 2004, pages 421-452.
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More information through EDIRC
Political Parties; Campaigning;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D89 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Other
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