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Campaign Advertising and Political Ambiguity

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Author Info
 Chappell, Henry W, Jr

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Abstract

This paper develops a model to explain candidates' strategic decisions to provide or withhold information about policy positions in the course of an election campaign. The analysis treats this problem as a game of imperfect information. Attention is focused on modeling voter suspicion of candidates whose positions are ambiguous. Specific numerical examples illustrate that candidate decisions about providing information via informative advertising depend upon candidate policy preferences, campaign fund endowments, partisan reputations, and incumbency status. The model also provides theoretical underpinnings for empirical findings regarding the effects of campaign advertising. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 79 (1994)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (June)
Pages: 281-303
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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:79:y:1994:i:3-4:p:281-303

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  1. Craig A. Depken II, 1997. "The Effects of Campaign Contribution Sources on the Congressional Elections of 1996," Public Economics 9703003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Tangerås, Thomas, 1998. "On the Role of Opinion Polls in Political Competition," Seminar Papers 655, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies. [Downloadable!]
  3. Westermark, Andreas, 2001. "Campaigning and Ambiguity when Parties Cannot Make Credible Election Promises," Working Paper Series 568, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Potters, J. & Sloof, R. & Winden, F. van, 1997. "Campaign expenditures, contributions and direct endorsements : the strategic use of information and money to influence voter behavior," Discussion Paper 27, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Westermark, Andreas, 1999. "Extremism, Campaigning and Ambiguity," Working Paper Series 1999:9, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

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