The Effects of Campaign Contribution Sources on the Congressional Elections of 1996
AbstractThe debate over campaign-finance reform includes how different sources of campaign contributions affect the outcomes of political campaigns. Using data from the Congressional races of 1996, I find that PAC contributions had a larger effect on the percentage of votes received and campaign outcomes relative to individual and political party contributions. Incumbency advantage is negated after accounting for contributions to all candidates in a political race.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 9703003.
Length: 10 pages
Date of creation: 28 Mar 1997
Date of revision:
Note: Type of Document - Tex/; prepared on PC-TEX; to print on PostScript; pages: 10; figures: none
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Web page: http://220.127.116.11
elections; Congress; campaign runding; Political Action Committees;
Other versions of this item:
- Depken, Craig A., 1998. "The effects of campaign contribution sources on the congressional elections of 1996," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 211-215, February.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- K0 - Law and Economics - - General
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- Scully, Gerald W, 1995. " Congressional Tenure: Myth and Reality," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 83(3-4), pages 203-19, June.
- Chappell, Henry W, Jr, 1994. " Campaign Advertising and Political Ambiguity," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(3-4), pages 281-303, June.
- Noel Johnson & William Ruger & Jason Sorens & Steven Yamarik, 2014. "Corruption, regulation, and growth: an empirical study of the United States," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 51-69, February.
- Noel Johnson & Courtney LaFountain & Steven Yamarik, 2011. "Corruption is bad for growth (even in the United States)," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 377-393, June.
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