Does tenure in office affect regional growth? The role of public capital productivity
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 146 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Tenure in office; Public capital productivity; GDP growth; Regional governments; D70; H11; H50; O18;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
- O18 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure
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